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JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE FEDERAL WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1972: WHICH FEDERAL COURT?
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
(the Act)' seek to eradicate water pollution through the cooperative
interaction of the state and federal governments. 2 Under the program
instituted by the Act, Congress changed the focus of pollution abatement from regulating the quality of water to controlling the amount
and character of effluents discharged into water.3 The demarcation,
however, between state control and federal authority is vague.'
Clearly, under § 304(b)5 of the Act, the Administrator of the Environ33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
(Supp. II, 1972)[hereinafter cited as the Act]. The statutory references will be those
found in the Act as set out in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 et seq. See generally, Linn, Deficiencies in
the Regulatory Scheme of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 208 (1974); Comment, The Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 14 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rev. 672 (1973); Comment, The
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: Effective Controls At
Last?, 39 BROOK. L. REv. 403 (1972).
2 To what extent the Act promotes federalism is unclear. One of the policies of
the Act is the recognition of "the primary responsibilities and rights" of the states to
combat pollution, § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 2151(b)(Supp. IV, 1974), but the precise roles
of the states and the federal government in sharing the duties of enforcement are but
vaguely indicated. The Act, however, has been viewed as an attempt to establish
federal control over the abatement of water pollution because of dissatisfaction with
the efforts of the states, Smith, Highlights of the FederalWater Pollution ControlAct
of 1972, 77 DICK. L. REV. 459, 462 n.7 (1973); see Library of Congress, Environmental
Policy Division, A Legislative History of the WaterPollutionControlAct Amendments
of 1972, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. at 1422 (Comm. Print 1973)[hereinafter cited as Leg.
Hi-st.]; 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 3.03 at 3-58 to 3-59 (1975).
Conversely, the policies have been described as perhaps promising a "creative federalism." McThenia, An Examinationof the FederalWater Pollution ControlAct of 1972,
30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 195, 219 (1973).
' See, e.g., Leg. Hist., supra note 2 at 1425; Ipsen & Raisch, Enforcement under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 9 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 369, 375 (1975). "Effluents," it can be inferred from the definition of effluent
limitations, see note 6 infra, are chemical, physical, biological, and other constitutents
which are discharged from point sources into water.
See note 2 supra.
Section 304(b) provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of adopting or revising effluent limitations under
this chapter the Administrator shall, after consultation with appropriate Federal and State agencies and other interested persons, publish
within one year of October 18, 1972, regulations, providing guidelines
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mental Protection Agency (EPA) may issue guidelines' which serve
as suggestions for the subsequent promulgation of binding limitations
on the effluent discharge from existing plants.7 But is is unclear
whether the state or the federal government is to undertake the next
step of enacting the specific limitations for which § 304(b) provides
advisory guidelines. Section 3011 of the Act authorizes these specific
for effluent limitations, and at least annually thereafter, revise, if
appropriate, such regulations.
§ 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(Supp. IV, 1974).
"Guidelines" are not expressly defined in the Act but are normally considered
to be more advisory in nature than concrete effluent limitations, which are restrictions,
including compliance schedules, established by the EPA Administrator or by a state
on the amounts, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, or biological constitutents discharged from point sources, see notes 7 and 8, infra, into water, § 502(11), 33
U.S.C. § 1362(11)(Supp. IV, 1974). See Davis & Glasser, The DischargePermit Program Under the Federal Water Pollution ControlAct of 1972-Improvement of Water
Quality Through the Regulations of Dischargesfrom IndustrialFacilities,2 FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. 179, 211 & n.196 (1974), reprinted in 6 ENVIRONMENT L. REV. 211 (1975).
See also Brief for Appellant at 32 n.1, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 528
F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3585 (U.S. Apr. 20, 1976)(No. 75978), in which appellant du Pont suggested that guidelines in other areas of law identify limits of possible action rather than "hard and fast rules," noting, for example,
HEW guidelines for school desegregation plans.
Existing plants, more particularly designated as "point sources" which are existing, specific conveyances such as pipes, ditches, or vessels from which effluents are
discharged, § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)(Supp. IV, 1974), are distinguished in the
Act from new plants or sources. Compare § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. IV, 1974),
with § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. IV, 1974).
Section 301(b) provides in pertinent part:
In order to carry out the objective of this chapter there shall be
achieved(1)(A) not later than July 1, 1977, effluent limitations for point
sources, other than publicly owned treatment works, (i) which shall
require the application of the best practicable control technology currently available as defined by the Administrator pursuant to section
1314(b)[§ 304(b)] of this title ....
(2)(A) not later than July 1, 1983, effluent limitations for categories and classes of point sources, other than publicly owned treatment
works, which (i) shall require application of the best available technology economically achievable for such category or class

. . .

as deter-

mined in accordance with regulations issued by the Administrator or
pursuant to section 1314(b)(2) [§ 304(b)] ....
§ 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(Supp. IV, 1974). For a discussion of the differences
between the 1977 and 1983 standards, see Note, The Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972: Ambiguity as a Control Device, 10 HAv. J. LEGIS. 565, 57787 (1973). See also Tanner's Council, Inc. v. Train, No. 74-1740 at 13-14 (4th Cir. Mar.
10, 1976).
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effluent limitations, with which industrial dischargers must comply,
but the section is written in passive language, and does not indicate
to which government it gives authority. Therefore, the EPA may be
empowered both to suggest § 304(b) guidelines and to promulgate
§ 301 binding effluent limitations. Alternatively, the EPA may be
restricted to issuing § 304(b) guidelines while the states, under the
power of the § 402 permit program,9 have the authority to use the
guidelines to enact § 301 limitations. Under this latter scheme, the
EPA would be relegated to reviewing § 301 limitations only as part
of its duty to supervise the § 402 state permit program.'"
Besides being essential to a determination of the scope of federal
authority, the question of the Administrator's capacity under § 301
may have to be answered to decide which federal forum, a district
court or a court of appeals, has jurisdiction to review the Administrator's actions. Section 509(b)(1)" provides that direct judicial review
I Section 302, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. IV, 1974), establishes a permit program
by which permits for effluent discharge may be issued by the Administration, § 402
(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974), or by a state which has adopted a
program approved by the Administrator. § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (Supp. IV,
1974). The Administrator retains veto power over objectionable state-issued permits,
§ 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). See generally Bernbom, The
National Permit Program:A Polluter'sBridge Over Troubled Water? 7 Loy. (Cm.) U.
L.J. 1 (1976).
,* See note 9 supra.
* Section 509(b)(1) provides in pertinent part:
Review of the Administrator's action ....
(E) in approving or
promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation under section
1311 [§ 3011, 1312 [§ 3021, or 1316 [§ 306] of this title . . . may
be had by an interested person in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
United States for the Federal judicial district in which such person
resides or transacts such business upon application by such person.
§ 509(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(Supp. IV, 1974). The fervor with which challengers
of EPA regulations have sought to circumvent this appellate court jurisdiction arises
from several practical reasons. First, review at the trial court level is usually protracted. Letter from Ray E. McDevitt, Associate General Counsel, Water Quality
Division, EPA, Mar. 4, 1976. Such delay postpones the establishment of binding legal
obligations, and even if the district court proceeding is concluded rapidly, review in
an appellate court remains available. Id. See Brief for Appellee at 40, E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3585
(U.S. Apr. 20, 1976)(No. 75-978). Ongoing litigation may not only defer the Act's
mandates, but it also allows the challengers to make equitable arguments that time
extensions for compliance with the regulations be granted to offset the time spent
litigating the legality of the regulations. Letter from Ray E. McDevitt, Associate
General Counsel, Water Quality Division, EPA, Mar. 4, 1976. Finally, at the district
court level there are many more forums from which a challenger may choose. There
are 89 district courts as opposed to 11 circuit courts. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS §§ 2, 3 at 6, 8 (1970). This increased number also allows a more precise
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of the Administrator's approval or promulgation of effluent limitations under § 301 may be had in the court of appeals for the circuit
in which the interested party lives or transacts business. Section 304
which, unlike § 301, expressly grants authority to the Administrator,
is not included in § 509's provision for judicial review. The § 509
jurisdictional issue thus becomes intertwined with the issue of the
Administrator's authority, if any, to promulgate effluent limitations
under § 301. If the Administrator publishes regulations and if the
regulations are deemed binding effluent limitations promulgated
under § 301, they are reviewable in courts of appeals under § 509. If,
however, the Administrator's regulations are deemed mere guidelines
for state action issued pursuant to the express authority of § 304, they
are reviewable only in district courts under general jurisdiction statutes. 2 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train,13 held that the courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review EPA regulations under § 509.11 The court,
however, found it unnecessary to its disposition of the jurisdictional
issue to ascertain the Administrator's authority under § 301.5
In du Pont, the Fourth Circuit upheld a district court dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of a suit by eight chemical
selection of judges. Letter from Ray E. McDevitt, Associate General Counsel, Water
Quality Divison, EPA, Mar. 4, 1976.
"1 Besides the Administrative Procedure Act, see note 30 infra, the following statutes provide bases of jurisdiction in federal district courts: 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)(federal question and amount in controversy of $10,000); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) (diversity
of citizenship and amount in contrioversy of $10,000); 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970)(jurisdiction to issue writs); and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970)(the Declaratory Judgment Act).
These statutes were suggested by du Pont as jurisdictional bases in the district court.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 383 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 n.1 (W.D. Va. 1974).
See J. MACDONALD & J. CONWAY, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION §§ 8.29-8.31 (1972) wherein the authors discuss the possible utilization of these jurisdictional bases for environmental actions generally.
13 538 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3585 (U.S. Apr. 20,
1976)(No. 75-978). Besides the jurisdictional attack, du Pont also filed protective petitions for review. The regulations, therefore, were reviewed in E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Train, No. 73-1261 (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 1976).
" 528 F.2d at 1137.
Id. at 1141, accord, American Petroleum Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir.
1975). Cf. American Paper Inst. v. Train, 381 F. Supp. 553 (D.D.C. 1974). The
American Papercourt, choosing between plaintiff's argument that the challenged regulations were § 304 guidelines and defendant EPA's contention that they were § 301
limitations, determined that they were limitations and therefore dismissed the suit for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 554.
"1 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 383 F. Supp. 1244 (W.D. Va. 1974).
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manufacturers' 7 who challenged regulations' intended to establish
effluent limitations for existing inorganic chemical plants.'9 The regulations stated that they had been promulgated pursuant to both § 301
and § 304(b).20 The court of appeals declared that the only question
to be decided was whether federal district courts could review the
regulations concerning existing plants or whether the courts of ap2
peals had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction. '
The EPA's argument for jurisdiction in the courts of appeals, as
summarized by the Fourth Circuit, was a simple one. Congress had
intended that the Administrator rather than the states promulgate
actual effluent limitations under § 301.22 The Administrator, the EPA
argued, had combined his guideline-issuing authority under § 304
and his limitation-promulgating authority under § 301 to produce the
regulations challenged by du Pont.2 Because § 301 actions are directly reviewable in courts of appeals under § 509, and these regulations were promulgated thereunder, the EPA concluded
that the dis24
trict court properly dismissed du Pont's complaint.
,7 In addition to du Pont, the plaintiffs included: Allied Chemical Corporation;
American Cyanamid Company; the Dow Chemical Company; FMC Corporation; Hercules, Inc.; Monsanto Company; and Olin Corporation.
"1 39 Fed. Reg. 9612, 40 C.F.R. 415 (1975). The regulations addressed standards
of performance for new plants, pretreatment standards for new plants discharging
wastes into municipal treatment plants, and effluent limitations for existing plants.
528 F.2d at 1137. Du Pont challenged only the last of these because the Administrator's
actions relating to new plants, under § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. IV, 1974), are
clearly within the ambit of § 509,33 U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. IV, 1974). See note 11 supra.
,1 "Inorganic chemicals manufacturing" was included on the original list of
source categories for which the Administrator was mandated to publish regulations in
§ 306(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974). "Source" indicates any
building or installation from which pollutants may be discharged. § 306(a)(3), 33
U.S.C. § 1316(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
20 The regulations, characterized as "final rulemaking" were also promulgated
pursuant to § 307(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(c)(Supp. IV, 1974), which deals with pretreatment standards for new sources. 39 Fed. Reg. 9612, 40 C.F.R. 415 (1975).
21 528 F.2d at 1137. For the notion that appellate court jurisdiction, if found,
would have to be exclusive, the Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's statement in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 458 (1974), that when legislation expressly provides a specific remedy, courts
should not expand the statute to embrace other remedies. Although the Fourth Circuit
then compared § 505(a) of the Act, which invests district courts with jurisdiction to
hear citizen suits, with § 509, the use of the PassengerCorp. edict begged the question
of the statute's grant of jurisdiction, for the jurisdictional controversy itself arises from
the ambiguity of the statute. See American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027,
1073 (3d Cir. 1975) (Adams, J., concurring).
2 528 F.2d at 1138.
2, Id. at 1139. See note 20 supra.
21 528 F.2d at 1139. See 383 F. Supp. 1244, 1256.
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Conversely, du Pont maintained that the Administrator had no
power under § 301 to promulgate effective effluent limitations.' Du
Pont, as had previous challengers to actions of the Administrator,"
noted the passive language of that section and interpreted it as
merely expressive of statutory objectives rather than as conferring
any authority upon the EPA. According to du Pont, the § 301 objectives were to be implemented by the § 402 state permit programs"
operated pursuant to § 304 guidelines. 8 Thus, the regulations could
only have been issued under § 304(b), 9 rendering § 509(b)(1) review
in the appellate court unavailable, and necessitating review in the
district courts pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.2
Stating that an interpretation of the Administrator's authority
under § 301 should not absolutely govern the issue of which court had
jurisdiction,2" the Fourth Circuit rested its holding that the complaint
had been properly dismissed by the district court on three related
grounds: the express language of § 509(b)(1)(E);12 the illogic of having
§ 306 effluent regulations for new point sources reviewed by courts of
appeals under § 509, which explicitly lists § 306, while § 301 regulations for existing point sources would be reviewed by district courts
under the Administrative Procedure Act;3" and, the logic of linking
§ 301, which expresses statutory goals, with § 304, which provides
means for attaining those goals.3
As had the district court, 5 the Fourth Circuit noted that the ex21 528 F.2d at 1139.
28

See, e.g., American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).

2 See note 9 supra.
21

528 F.2d at 1139.

29

Id.

5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970). The Administrative Procedure Act offers judicial
review to any person "suffering legal wrong because of agency action" or to any person
"adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). "Agency action" includes all or part of "an agency
rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to
act." 5 U.S.C. § 551(13)(1970). The Administrative Procedure Act does not apply if
there is another adequate judicial remedy. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970). Therefore, du Pont
could allege that, because § 304 actions are not covered by § 509, there is no judicial
review provided in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, and
the Administrative Procedure Act must be activated. Indeed, some commentators
have advised that the Administrative Procedure Act be routinely invoked as a jurisdictional basis whenever judicial review of agency action is sought in district court. J.
MACDONALD & J. CONWAY, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION § 8.29 at 219 (1972).
20

"1528 F.2d at 1141.
.12 Id.
3 Id. See note 30 supra.

31 528 F.2d at 1142.
11383 F. Supp. at 1250.
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plicit language of § 509(b)(1)(E) provides for review in federal courts
of appeals of the Administrator's approval or promulgation of effluent
or other limitations pursuant to §§ 301, 302, or 306.36 It appears that
Congress intended that § 301 effluent limitations for existing sources,
§ 302 water quality related effluent limitations, and § 306 effluent
limitations for new sources be subject to § 509 judicial review. A strict
reading of § 509, however, based upon du Pont's contention that
§ 304 actions are not covered by the § 509 review provision and that
§§ 304 and 301 are inseparable, would dictate the challenging of new
source regulations in courts of appeals while regulations for existing
sources would be challenged in district courts.37 Congress, the court
concluded, did not intend this inconsistency.38 No mention of bifurcated review could be found in the Act's legislative history. 9 Moreover, the court indicated that after some disagreement between the
Senate, 0 which favored the courts of appeals, and the House,4' which
favored the
district courts, the Senate's choice of forum apparently
42
prevailed.
In addition, the court stated that even if § 301 simply declares
statutory goals, as du Pont had argued, the appellate courts still had
original jurisdiction. 3 The goals of § 301 are mandatory and must be
implemented through the mechanisms of § 304(b), which plainly
delineates the guidelines-issuing powers of the Administrator."
Therefore, § 304 actions activate the specific policies in § 301. This
analysis, the court concluded, suggests that the sections are mutually
3' See note 11 supra.
7 528 F.2d at 1141.
'Id.

3' Id. See Leg. Hist., supra note 2. For an idea of the breadth of the Act's legislative history, see also McThenia, An Examination of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 195, 202 n.31 (1973).
' Leg. Hist., supra note 2, at 330.
IId.

Id. at 330-31.
528 F.2d at 1142.
"Id. See note 5 supra.The Fourth Circuit in E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Train, No. 74-1261 at 13, 16 (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 1976) reinforced approval of this concept
of combining § 301 and § 304 power, accord, Tanners' Council, Inc. v. Train, No. 741740 at 4 (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 1976); FMC Corp. v. Train, No. 74-1586 at 5 (4th Cir. Mar.
10, 1976), American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464 at 38-40 (D.C. Cir. May
11, 1976). Observing that the EPA was under the compulsion of a judicially ordered
timetable. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 710-14
(D.C. Cir. 1974), the du Pont court noted that the Act does not forbid combining the
two steps and that such action by the EPA was sufficiently reasonable to be accepted
by reviewing courts under the authority of Train v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975).
42
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dependent, and any final action must be reviewable under § 509."
In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit briefly reviewed several cases which had dealt with the interrelationship of § § 301 and
304, and the judicial review problem under § 50,9. The court first
discussed the Eighth Circuit's contrary holding in CPCInternational,
Inc. v. Train." In CPC, the Eighth Circuit had focused upon the fact
that § 301 delegated to the Administrator no direct power to promulgate effluent limitations for existing point sources, whereas such
power for new sources had been given in § 306(b)(1)(B).1T Since the
Administrator had been empowered to issue effective national limitations in § 306 and other sections of the Act, the CPC court reasoned
that the omission of such power in § 301 was purposeful." Thus, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that courts of appeals had no § 509 jurisdiction to review EPA regulations for existing point sources because they
could only be issued pursuant to § 304(b), a section not mentioned
in § 509.11
The du Pont court rejected the Eighth Circuit's ruling by declaring that a determination of the Administrator's authority under § 301
did not alone solve the jurisdictional problem. 0 Instead, the Fourth
Circuit interpreted the Act to require the reading of § § 301 and 304
together, thus ensuring appellate court jurisdiction under § 509.1 The
du Pont court, however, apparently failed to consider several other
reasons given by the Eighth Circuit in support of its holding.
First, the CPC court noted that the regulations challenged in
that case had been entitled effluent limitations guidelines,"2 a term
defined by the EPA to indicate regulations issued pursuant to
§ 304(b). 53 Thus, it appeared that even the EPA accepted the proposition that the Administrator had no § 301 authority to promulgate
binding limitations. Additionally, the Eighth Circuit pointed out
11528

F.2d at 1142.

46 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).

11 Id. at 1038. This is the segment of the CPC opinion which the du Pont court
isolated as the chief rationale for CPC's contrary holding. 528 F.2d at 1139. The CPC
court also noted that national standards could be promulgated by the Administrator
under § 307(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2)(Supp. IV, 1974), for toxic discharges and
under § 307(b) and (c), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) and (c)(Supp. IV, 1974), for pretreatment
standards. 515 F.2d at 1038.
a See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
" 515 F.2d at 1037.
528 F.2d at 1141.
Id. at 1142.
52 40 C.F.R. 406.12 and 406.13 (1975). The challenged regulations in du Pont had
been similarly labelled. 39 Fed. Reg. 6912, 40 C.F.R. 415 (1975).
" 515 F.2d at 1037 n.9. See 40 C.F.R. 401.11(j)(1975).
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that § 402(d)(2)'s reference to permits "outside the guidelines""
made plain that the permit-granting authorities, presumably the
states, were intended to consult the § 304(b) guidelines and not to
follow independent regulations promulgated under § 301.11 This
meant that the Administrator had no power to fulfill the § 301 objectives because it lay with the states. The du Pont district court,
in contrast, concluded that "guidelines" in § 402(d)(2) referred to
§ 304(h), which concerns "guidelines" for the administrative details
of a state's permit program such as funding and personnel qualifications." The CPC court did not consider this possibility, but noted
that the term "guidelines" in § 304(h) referred to a state's permit
program, and not to the administrative requirements which must be
included within each permit. 7 According to the Eighth Circuit, the
resulting division of powers between the EPA and the states would
ensure the uniformity of action sought in the Act.5
The CPC court also noted that § 304(b) provided a one-year period within which guidelines must be published." If, as apparently
contended by the EPA, the guidelines were only intended for the
EPA's temporary use to aid in promulgating § 301 regulations, a
congressional inconsistency arose because a deadline was set for publication of the § 304 guidelines but not for promulgation of § 301
limitations. 0 Had the EPA been intended to promulgate the § 301
limitations as well as to issue the guidelines, two deadlines would
have been set by Congress. In other sections of the Act where the
Administrator had to follow a two-step procedure of publishing information and then publishing standards based upon that information,
two different deadlines had been designated.6 ' Thus, the court concluded that Congress had not empowered the EPA to promulgate the
limitations under § 301, but had left this duty to the individual states
by establishing the § 402 permit program."
Finally, the CPC court noted the absence of a reference in § 301
51Section 402(d)(2) provides in pertinent part that if a state-proposed permit is
objected to by the Administrator because it is "outside the guidelines" set by him, it
will not issue. § 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)(Supp. IV, 1974). See note 9 supra.
" 515 F.2d at 1038-39.
383 F. Supp. at 1252.
515 F.2d at 1038-39 n.14.
Id. at 1039. Thus uniformity would result by issuance of the EPA guidelines to
be followed by the states, which would promulgate the actual limitations themselves.
' Id.
" Id.

, Id. at 1039 n. 15.
Id. at 1038.
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to the Effluent Standards and Water Quality Information Advisory
Committee (ESWQIAC)6 3 Under §§ 304(b), 306(b), and 307(a),
ESWQIAC is to be notified of all proposed regulations so that it can
hold scientific hearings 4 and convey to the EPA any relevant technical information it possesses. 5 Because a reference to the Committee
was included in those sections, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
there would have been one in § 301 if the Administrator was intended
to promulgate effective effluent limitations thereunder. 6 This further
disparity between §§ 304 and 306, which explicitly delineate the powCrs of the Administrator, and § 301, which may not, evinces the
sections' separability, and therefore provides additional proof that
the Administrator has no § 301 power.
The CPC court derived support for its holding that the Administrator had no authority to promulgate actual effluent limitations, and
consequently that circuit courts did not have jurisdiction to review
such EPA actions under § 509, from the Act's legislative history. The
court recognized that the Act was intended to establish uniformity
of conditions among plants of the same industry. 7 However, the court
concluded that this result flowed more properly from the EPA's
power to issue permits and to veto state-issued permits which did not
comport with § 304(b) guidelines, rather than from any EPA power
to promulgate § 301 limitations themselves. 8 The Act's legislative
history had emphasized the importance of the precision of the § 304
guidelines," on the apparent theory that the more specific the guidelines, the easier the sought after uniformity could be attained. This
concern with the precision of the EPA-issued guidelines made little
sense if the EPA was itself empowered to promulgate the limitations." Furthermore, the Administrator's veto power over objectionable state-issued permits would be superfluous if the EPA was actually
sanctioned to promulgate § 301 regulations. 7 Impliedly, the final
scheme for uniformity included a more flexible sharing of power be0 Id. at 1039. See § 515, 33 U.S.C. § 1374 (Supp. IV, 1974). The regulations
challenged in du Pont noted that the current state of ESWQIAC's development did
not justify delaying the issuance of the standards to await that committee's opinion.
39 Fed. Reg. 9612, 9612-13, 40, C.F.R. 415 (1975).
', § 515(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1374(b)(1)(Supp. IV, 1974).
'5 § 515(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1374(b)(2)(Supp. IV, 1974).
6 515 F.2d at 1039.
67 Id.

Id. at 1038-39.
, See, e.g., Leg. Hist., supra note 2, at 309.
70 515 F.2d at 1042.
7' Id. at 1040-41.
'g
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tween the *federal government, which would provide leadership
through guidelines, and the state governments, which would in fact
establish the limitations through permit decisions. These policies
aligned with the CPC court's narrow reading of § 301, which the court
held did not grant the Administrator power to promulgate limitations. 2 Because the Administrator had no § 301 power, but only the
§ 304 authority to issue guidelines, the court held that § 509's lack of
reference to § 304 required review of the Administrator's
actions in a
3
district court rather than a court of appeals.1
Although the Fourth Circuit in du Ppnt did not specifically treat
many of the issues raised in CPC because of its refusal to examine
§ 301 authority alone, the du Pont court did discuss the Third Circuit's decision in American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA,"4 which
countered some of the arguments raised in CPC. Unfortunately, the
American Iron court did not consider the § 509 jurisdictional question. It did hold, however, contrary to CPC, that the Administrator
was empowered to promulgate nationwide effluent limitations for
existing point sources 5 under § 301. By so holding, the Third Circuit
implicitly presumed appellate court jurisdiction under § 509.16 Thus,
with regard to the jurisdictional issue, the Third Circuit in American
Iron reached the same result as the Fourth Circuit in du Pont, though
American Iron did not discuss the issue explicitly and du Pont
discussed it exclusively.
In examining the Administrator's § 301 authority, the American
Iron court, like the Eighth Circuit in CPC,"1 began its analysis by
stating that the answer to the problem lay at the "very heart of the
administration of the Act,"7 8 the interrelationship of §§ 301 and 304
and their relation to § 402. The Third Circuit reconciled § 301 and
§ 304 in an original fashion. Concentrating first on § 304, the court
noted that the Administrator's duty in issuing guidelines is to specify
factors" to be taken into account when setting control measures ap72

Id. at 1037.

73

Id.

7

526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975).

75 Id. at 1037.
76 American Petroleum Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir. 1975). The

American Petroleum court, like the du Pont and American Meat courts, held that
courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review EPA regulations under the Act. Id.
7 515 F.2d at 1036.
76 American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1035 (3d Cir. 1975).
7,These factors include cost, the age of the facilities and the equipment involved,
engineering aspects of the various kinds of control techniques, and non-water quality
environmental impact. § 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974);
§ 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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plicable to point sources within industry categories." This, stated
the court, means that the Administrator's § 304 guidelines, issued on
the basis of broad classes of industries, are to guide the state permit
grantors when they ascertain the precise degree of effluent control
required of any individual point source within a broad class. 81 Thus,
the Administrator's initial factor considerations indicate to the permit grantors how variations in the standards should be made, and
allow some, albeit circumscribed, discretion to the permit-granting
states. " The uniformity desired is achieved through effluent standards within a given category which are similar but not necessarily
identical." According to the court, this system requires that the § 301
effluent limitations complement the § 304 procedure by indicating
the minimum degree of technological effluent control permissible as
well as the maximum amount of effluent discharge allowable within
a given industrial category.84 Once the Administrator determines this
range of acceptable effluent control and discharge pursuant to § 301,
he must issue the § 304 guidelines which aid the states in deciding
what limitations should be applied to each individual point source. 5
The American Iron court's version of the interplay between § 301 and
§ 304 thus places § 301 power as well as § 304 power with the EPA,
and therefore insures § 509 judicial review in the circuit courts.
The American Iron scheme for reconciling § 301 and § 304 also
answers several of the CPC court's statements. CPC had declared, for
example, that the Act's emphasis upon the precision of the § 304
guidelines would be unnecessary if the permit grantors must look not
to those guidelines but to EPA-created § 301 limitations. 8 This argument fails if the permit grantors, as American Iron held, are bound
to follow § 301 limitations and § 304 guidelines,87 both of which originate with the EPA. The American Iron interpretation of the connection between § 301 and § 304 is more logically satisfying than the
means and ends blending rationale propounded in du Pont," and it
11American
"'

Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1042 (3d Cir. 1975).

Id.

Id. at 1044.

Id. The uniformity is achieved through congressional establishment of a uniform
"ceiling" which no polluter could exceed.
" Id. at 1045. The determinations to be made are whether the limitations are more
demanding in terms of the effective technology the source must employ, and whether
they are more demanding in terms of requiring a lower amount of effluent discharge
than is permitted under the ceiling.
'Id.

515 F.2d at 1042.
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1044 n.38 (3d Cir. 1975).
See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra. Another effect of the American Iron
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makes exafnination of the jurisdictional issue superfluous. If the
Administrator has both § 301 and § 304 powers, which are separate
but complementary, there can be no challenge that appellate court
jurisdiction is improper, because § 301 is covered by § 509. Once the
court has determined that the Administrator has § 301 and § 304
authority, the regulations which he publishes can be deemed to stem
from the exercise of both these powers, thereby enabling direct review
in the courts of appeals. Du Pont's holding, although virtually identical in effect, was reached through the more facile .method of finding
§ 301 and § 304 to be inextricable because of the necessity to link the
means of § 304 with the ends of § 301. This analysis ignores the fact
that § 301, despite its passive language, is also descriptive of a means:
the effluent limitations themselves.
The disparate analyses in American Iron and du Pont account for
the decisions' complementary results. Du Pont declared that an
examination of § 301 authority alone was not needed to resolve the
§ 509 jurisdictional problem.89 But the Fourth Circuit reconciled
§ 301 with § 304 by holding that, to be effective at all, both sections
must be read together. Consequently, together, they were held to fall
within the purview of § 509.90 The American Iron court, rather than
trying to determine which federal court had jurisdiction to review
EPA regulations, focused upon the issue of § 301 authority.' By
noting that the Administrator possessed § 304 authority and by holding that he must necessarily have § 301 authority to effect § 304, the
court implied that appellate court jurisdiction under § 509 was procourt's construction of the Act is that it simultaneously promotes active federalism by
retaining some division of power between the federal and state governments and, by
placing most of the responsibility with the federal agency, renders uniformity more
likely.
Regarding uniformity, one commentator has suggested that the EPA has the dis-

cretion to determine the extent to which the congressional policy goals of the Act will
be achieved, thus implying that the impetus behind the Act's effectiveness is not state
action. Comment, Judicial Review and the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution ControlAct: And Who Shall Guardthe Guards?, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 770, 78586 (1973). Further, as the EPA argued in CPC with regard to the Administrator's power

to veto objectionable permits, if too much power is left with the states, there is imminent political and economic danger because industrial polluters may threaten to move
their plants out of any state that tries to enforce its environmental policy laws through
the imposition of effective effluent limitations. 515 F.2d at 1041 n.16. Such dangers
are reduced if the EPA bears most of the responsibility. See Leg. Hist., supra note 2,
at 577.
U 528 F.2d at 1141.
Id. at 1142.
, American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1036-42 (3d Cir. 1975).
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per. Thus, both cases reconciled § 301 and § 304 authority and gave
the EPA more power than that given by the CPC court which, because it found that the EPA had no § 301 authority," determined that
9 3
jurisdiction was in the district court.
Another case discussed by du Pont but dismissed as irrelevant,
illumines du Pont's unique handling of the jurisdictional issue. The
Seventh Circuit in American Meat Institute v. EPA94 held that the
EPA had § 301 authority to promulgate effluent limitations and that
the courts of appeals had § 509 jurisdiction to review such regulations. In so holding, the court determined that the relevant standard
by which to measure the parties' arguments was not whether the
EPA's construction of the Act was unassailable, but whether it was
sufficiently reasonable to preclude the court from substituting its
judgment for that of the agency. Thus, under the American Meat
standard of review, there appears a rebuttable presumption of the
correctness of the EPA's inferpretation of the Act.
The Fourth Circuit decided that this presumption was irrelevant
when a court seeks to ascertain its own jurisdiction, which was the
sole issue in du Pont.7 In support of its decision, the court noted that
federal court jurisdiction is conferred by Congress and not by the
determination of a governmental agency. Implicit in the acceptance
of the EPA's construction of the Act, however, is the acceptance of
the EPA's § 509 argument for jurisdiction in the appellate courts.
515 F.2d at 1037.
Id. at 1038.
' 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975).
'5 Id. at 452.
'6 Id. at 449-50. As had American Iron, American Meat relied upon Train v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975). In that case, which
involved the interpretation of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857
et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970), the Supreme Court
held that the EPA's construction of that complex statute was sufficiently reasonable
to block its substitution by a court of appeals' interpretation. 421 U.S. at 87. See Udall
v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1965). In Hardy, Train v. Natural Resources Defense
Council: The Genesis of a New Era of Federal-StateRelationships in Air Pollution
Control, 24 CLEVE. ST. L. REv. 397, 408 (1975), the writer observed that the Court did
not disapprove, as a matter of law, the constructions of the Clean Air Act forwarded
by the courts, but merely noted their error in substituting their interpretations for the
EPA's. Such an approach will likely be considered, if not precisely used by the Court,
when the Court considers the du Pont case. See also Comment, EnvironmentalLawClean Air Act Amendments-State Implementation Plans-Postponements-Revisions-Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975), 14 DUQ.
'3

L. REV. 111, 117 (1975), 4 K. DAvIS,
g1
"8

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

528 F.2d at 1140.
Id. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943).

§ 30.10 (1958).
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Thus, if the EPA's interpretation of the Act was presumed proper, the
du Pont court could have found further support for its holding on the
jurisdictional issue by presuming the correctness of the EPA's construction of § 509, which represents an explicit delegation of jurisdiction to the courts of appeals by Congress. 9
The du Pont court, however, found appellate court jurisdiction
without utilizing the American Meat presumption. Despite its refusal
to examine § 301 authority, 1®' the court necessarily discussed the
relationship of § 301 and § 304 to hold that the Administrator's actions came within the purview of § 509 jurisdiction.' Thus, the du
Pont decision diverged only slightly from earlier cases which had
examined § 301 authority alone. Even though the Third Circuit in
American Iron ignored the § 509 jurisdictional problem, the court
impliedly assumed jurisdiction by finding that the Administrator had
§ 301 authority to promulgate limitations, and that this responsibility augmented his explicit § 304 guideline-issuing duties." 2 Also examining § 301 power, the Eighth Circuit in CPC decided that that
section gave the Administrator no power to promulgate limitations
and that therefore the court of appeals had no jurisdiction to review
the challenged regulations. 03 Thus, each case which has confronted
the jurisdictional issue, either primarily or secondarily, has had to
deal with the power-distributing provisions of § 301 and § 304.
As several of these courts declared," 4 congressional oversight regarding these key sections of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 is surprising and regrettable. The cure, however, may be a relatively simple one. 5 Had Congress included § 304
among the sections within the ambit of § 509's judicial review, the
determination of the Administrator's authority under § 301 would be
unnecessary. Further, the use of active language in § 301, placing
"1 Such a notion has its limits; obviously an agency should not be able to obtain
jurisdiction in a particular forum merely because it interprets a statute to so mandate.
But this deference for the agency's interpretation would not be far from the one given
to the Administrator's construction of his §§ 301 and 304 power in E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, No. 74-1261 at 16 (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 1976). See note 45 supra.
10 528 F.2d at 1141.
"I Id. at 1142.

"1

526 F.2d at 1045.

,o3515 F.2d at 1037.
" See, e.g., American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1037 n.14a (3d
Cir. 1975), in which the court expressed concern over the confusion surrounding § 301
and urged Congress "to draft its legislation with greater clarity."
10 The du Pont court remarked that the "knotty question" of the application of
§ 509 could have been easily solved by a simple sentence or even a word. 528 F.2d at
1141 n.5.
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responsibility for promulgating regulations upon the Administrator
and thereby assuring the uniformity"'8 vital to the Act's success,
would have clarified the jurisdictional problem. Certiorari for du
Pont has been granted, 07 and perhaps with Supreme Court impetus
Congress will amend "the very heart of the administration of the
Act" 8 so that it may operate more efficiently, and the enunciated
aims of the Act can be sought with greater energy.

H. GREGORY WILLIAMS
See note 88 supra.
t E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3585 (U.S. Apr. 20, 1976)(No. 75-978).
" American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1035 (3d Cir. 1975).
'

